Recently, Argumentation Mechanism Design (ArgMD) was introduced as a new paradigm for studying argumentation among self-interested agents using game-theoretic techniques. Preliminary results showed a condition under which a direct mechanism based on Dung's grounded semantics is strategy-proof (i.e. truth enforcing). But these early results dealt with a highly restricted form of agent preferences, and assumed agents can only hide, but not lie about, arguments. In this paper, we characterise strategy-proofness under grounded semantics for a more realistic preference class (namely, focal arguments). We also provide the first analysis of the case where agents can lie.
Introduction
Argumentation has recently become one of the key approaches to automated reasoning and rational interaction in Artificial Intelligence [Bench-Capon and Dunne, 2007] . A key milestone has been Dung's landmark framework [Dung, 1995] . Arguments are viewed as abstract entities, with a binary defeat relation among them (resulting in a so-called argument graph). This view of argumentation enables highlevel analysis while abstracting away from the internal structure of individual arguments. Much research has been done on defining criteria (so-called semantics) for evaluating complex argument structures [Baroni and Giacomin, 2007] .
However, most research that employs Dung's approach discounts the fact that argumentation is often a multi-agent, adversarial process. Thus, the outcome of argumentation is determined not only by the rules by which arguments are evaluated, but also by the strategies employed by the agents who present these arguments. As these agents may be selfinterested, they may have conflicting preferences over which arguments end up being accepted. As such, the design of the argument evaluation rule should take the mechanism design perspective [Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Ch 23] : what game rules guarantee a desirable social outcome when each selfinterested agent selects the best strategy for itself?
Recently, we introduced Argumentation Mechanism Design (ArgMD) as a framework for analysing the strategic incentives in argumentation and applied it to the well-known grounded semantics [Rahwan and Larson, 2008] . However, this preliminary analysis focused on a rather peculiar form of agent preferences: each agent wishes to get as many of its arguments accepted as possible. Moreover, they assumed agents can only hide, but not lie about, arguments.
In this paper, we apply the ArgMD framework to a more natural form of agent preferences, namely situations in which each agent has a single focal argument it wishes to have accepted. We provide a full characterisation of the strategyproofness (i.e. truth-telling being a dominant strategy equilibrium) under grounded semantics when agents both hide and/or lie about arguments. We also provide intuitive, sufficient graph-theoretic conditions for strategy-proofness.
The paper advances the state-of-the-art in the computational modelling of argumentation in two major ways. Firstly, it provides the first comprehensive analysis of strategic incentives under grounded semantics when agents have focal arguments. This is a much more realistic (and common) form of agent preferences than the only other analysis undertaken to-date for grounded semantics (by [Rahwan and Larson, 2008] ). Secondly, the paper provides the first analysis of incentives when agents can lie in argumentation. This is important since it shows that the ArgMD approach can be extended to such more realistic cases.
Background
We now briefly outline some of key elements of abstract argumentation frameworks. We begin with Dung's abstract characterisation of an argumentation system [Dung, 1995] .
Definition 1 (Argumentation framework). An argumentation framework is a pair AF = A,
where A is a set of arguments and ⊆ A×A is a defeat relation. We say that an argument α defeats an argument β if (α, β) ∈ (sometimes written α β).
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An argumentation framework can be represented as a directed graph in which vertices are arguments and directed arcs characterise defeat among arguments.
Let
Definition 2 (Conflict-free, Defence). Let A, be an argumentation framework and let S ⊆ A and let α ∈ A.
• S is conflict-free if S ∩ S + = ∅.
• S defends argument α if α − ⊆ S + . We also say that argument α is acceptable with respect to S.
Intuitively, a set of arguments is conflict free if no argument in that set defeats another. A set of arguments defends a given argument if it defeats all its defeaters. We now look at the collective acceptability of a set of arguments.
When there is no ambiguity about the argumentation framework in question, we will use F instead of F AF .
Definition 4 (Acceptability semantics). Let S be a conflictfree set of arguments in framework A, .
• S is admissible if it is conflict-free and defends every element in S (i.e. if S ⊆ F(S)). • S is a complete extension if S = F(S).
• S is a grounded extension if it is the minimal (w.r.t. setinclusion) complete extension.
Intuitively, a set of arguments is admissible if it is a conflict-free set that defends itself against any defeater -in other words, if it is a conflict free set in which each argument is acceptable with respect to the set itself.
An admissible set S is a complete extension if and only if all arguments defended by S are also in S (that is, if S is a fixed point of the operator F). There may be more than one complete extension, each corresponding to a particular consistent and self-defending viewpoint.
A grounded extension contains all the arguments which are not defeated, as well as the arguments which are defended directly or indirectly by non-defeated arguments. This can be seen as a non-committal view (hence the least fixed point of F). There always exists a unique grounded extension.
Definition 5 (Indirect defeat and defence [Dung, 1995] 
Argumentation Mechanism Design
In this section we briefly define the mechanism design problem for abstract argumentation, as introduced by [Rahwan and Larson, 2008] . In particular, we specify the agents' type spaces and utility functions, what sort of strategic behaviour agents might indulge in, as well as the kinds of social choice functions we are interested in implementing.
We define a mechanism with respect to an argumentation framework A, with semantics S, and we assume that there is a set of I self-interested agents. We define an agent's type to be its set of arguments. 
As is standard in the mechanism design literature, we assume that agents have preferences over the outcomes o ∈ 2 A , represented in utility functions:
Agents may not have incentive to reveal their true types because they may be able to influence the status of arguments and thus obtain higher utility. On one hand, an agent might hide some of its arguments, e.g. to break defeat chains in the argument framework, thus changing the final set of acceptable arguments. Alternatively, an agent might lie by makingup new arguments that it does not have in its argument set. ArgMD aims to obtain the desired outcome (as per the social choice function) despite the potential for such manipulations.
A strategy of an agent specifies a complete plan that describes what action the agent takes for every decision that a player might be called upon to take, for every piece of information that the player might have at each time that it is called upon to act. In our model, the actions available to an agent involve announcing arguments according to some protocol. Thus a strategy, s i ∈ Σ i for agent i (where Σ i is i's strategy space) would specify for each possible subset of arguments that could define its type, what set of arguments to reveal. An agent's strategy space specifies all its possible strategies. Definition 8 (Argumentation Mechanism). Given an argumentation framework AF = A, and semantics S, an argumentation mechanism is defined as
Note that in the above definition, the notion of dialogue strategy is broadly construed and would depend on the argumentation protocol. In a direct mechanism, however, the strategy spaces of the agents are restricted so that they can only reveal a subset of arguments indicating its (alleged) type -that is, Σ i = 2 A . We focus here on direct mechanisms since, according to the revelation principle [Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Ch 23] , any equilibrium of an indirect mechanism has an equivalent truthful direct mechanism. This approach is common in the mechanism design literature, since it greatly simplifies analysis without losing generality.
In Table 1 , we summarise the mapping of multi-agent abstract argumentation as an a mechanism design problem.
We now present a direct mechanism for argumentation based on grounded semantics. The mechanism calculates the grounded extension given the arguments revealed by agents. We will refer to a specific action (i.e. set of declared arguments) as A
A is the set of strategies available to each agent;
, S grnd ) where S grnd denotes sceptical grounded acceptability semantics.
Agents with Focal Arguments
Earlier [Rahwan and Larson, 2008] , we analysed the grounded argumentation mechanism under a highly restrictive form of agent preferences, called acceptability maximising preference: each agent wishes to get as many of its arguments accepted as possible. This is rarely seen in practice.
In many realistic dialogues, each agent i is interested in the acceptance of a particular argumentα i ∈ A i , which we call the focal argument of agent i. Here, other arguments in A i \{α i } can merely be instrumental towards the acceptance of the focal argument. We are interested in characterising conditions under which M grnd AF is strategy-proof for scenarios in which each agent has a focal argument (Other preference criteria are also reasonable, such as wanting to win any argument from a set that support the same conclusion). 
Let o ∈ O be an arbitrary outcome. Ifα i ∈ o, we say that agent i wins in outcome o. Otherwise, i loses in outcome o.
When Agents can Hide Arguments
In this section, following our earlier work [Rahwan and Larson, 2008] , we assume that there is an external verifier that is capable of checking whether it is possible for a particular agent to actually make a particular argument. Informally, this means that presented arguments, while still possibly defeasible, must at least be based on some sort of demonstrable 'plausible evidence.' If an agent is caught making up arguments then it will be removed from the mechanism. For example, in a court of law, any act of perjury by a witness is punished, at the very least, by completely discrediting all evidence produced by the witness. Moreover, in a court of law, arguments presented without any plausible evidence are normally discarded (e.g. "I did not kill him, since I was abducted by aliens at the time of the crime!"). For all intents and purposes this assumption removes the incentive for an agent to make things up.
To investigate whether mechanism M grnd AF is strategyproof for any argumentation framework for agents with focal arguments, consider the following example. It turns out that the mechanism is susceptible to strategic manipulation, even if we suppose that agents do not lie by making up arguments (i.e., they may only withhold some arguments). In this case, for both agents y and z, revealing their true types weakly dominates revealing nothing at all (since hiding their single focal arguments can only guarantee their respective loss). However, it turns out that agent x is better off only revealing {α 4 }. By withholding α 1 , the resulting argument network becomes as depicted in Figure 1(b) . Under this outcome, x wins, which is better for x than truth-revealation. Remark 1. Given an arbitrary argumentation framework AF and agents with focal arguments, mechanism M grnd AF is not strategy-proof.
Having established this property, the natural question to ask is whether mechanism M grnd AF is strategy-proof under some conditions. The following theorem provides a full characterisation of strategy-proof mechanisms for sceptical argumentation frameworks, for agents with focal arguments, when hiding arguments is possible. Note that A −i denotes arguments of all agents other than agent i. Therefore, by definition of the focal argument:
Theorem 1. Let AF be an arbitrary argumentation framework, and let GE (AF ) denote its grounded extension. Mechanism M grnd AF is strategy-proof for agents with focal arguments if and only if AF satisfies the following condition: ∀i ∈ I, ∀S ⊆ A i and ∀A
−i , we haveα i / ∈ GE ( A i ∪A −i , ) impliesα i / ∈ GE ( (A i \S) ∪ A −i , ).
Proof. ⇒) Let i ∈
. Then, by contraposition we have that:
). We want to prove that:
Suppose not. Then ∃i and ∃S ⊆ A i such that
But this means thatα
). Contradiction. Therefore, i has no incentive to declare any arguments other than those of her type, and thus the mechanism is strategy-proof.
This result is consistent with the literature on mechanism design. While general strategy-proof results obtain only at the cost of dropping other desirable properties (like nondictatorship, as per the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [MasColell et al., 1995, Ch 23] ), positive results obtain by restricting the domain of types on which the mechanism is applied (e.g. restriction to quasi-linear preferences [Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Ch 21] ).
Although the above theorem gives us a full characterisation, it is difficult to apply in practice. In particular, the theorem does not give us an indication of how agents (or the mechanism designer) can identify whether the mechanism is strategy-proof for a class of argumentation frameworks by appealing to explicit graph-theoretic properties. Below, we provide such analysis. But before we can do this, we present the following lemma. This lemma explores what happens when we add a new argument (and its associated defeats) to a given argumentation framework, thus resulting in a new argumentation framework. In particular, we are interested in conditions under which arguments acceptable in the first framework are also accepted in the second. We show that this is true under the condition that the new argument does not indirectly defeat arguments acceptable in the first framework. Lemma 1 ([Rahwan and Larson, 2008] With the above lemma in place, we now provide an intuitive, graph-theoretic condition that is sufficient to ensure that M grnd AF is strategy-proof when agents have focal arguments. Theorem 2. Suppose every agent i ∈ I has a focal argument
. . , A I ) be arbitrary revelations from all agents not including i. We will show that agent i is always best off revealing A i . That is, no matter what sets of arguments the other agents reveal, agent i is best off revealing its full set of arguments. Formally, we will show that ∀i ∈ I u i (Acc(
We use induction over the sets of arguments agent i may reveal, starting from the focal argumentα i ( note that any strategy that does not revealα i can be safely ignored). We show that, considering any strategy A i ⊆ A i , revealing one more argument can only increase i's chance of gettingα i accepted, i.e. it (weakly) improves i's utility. Base Step: If A i = {α i }, then trivially, revealing A i weakly dominates revealing ∅. Induction Step: Suppose that revealing argument set A i ⊆ A i weakly dominates revealing any subset of A i . We need to prove that revealing any additional argument can increase, but never decrease the agent's utility. In other words, we need to prove that revealing any set A i , where
Let α where {α } = A i − A i be the new argument. Suppose the focal argumentα i is in the grounded extension when revealing
, S grnd )). We need to show that after adding α , argumentα i remains in the grounded extension. Formally, we need to show thatα
. This is true from Lemma 1, and from the fact that A i does not include indirect defeats againstα i . Thus, by induction, revealing the full set A i weakly dominates revealing any sub-set thereof.
Note that in the theorem, → is over all arguments in A. Intuitively, to guarantee the strategy-proof property for agents with focal arguments, it suffices that no (in)direct defeats exist from an agent's own arguments to its focal argument. Said differently, each agent i's arguments must not undermine its own focal argument, neither explicitly and implicitly. By 'explicitly,' we mean that none of i's own arguments can defeat its focal argument. By 'implicitly,' we mean that other agents cannot possibly present a sequence of arguments that reveal an indirect defeat between i's own arguments and its focal argument. More concretely, in Example 1 and Figure 1(a) , while agent x's argument set A x = {α 1 , α 4 } is conflict-free, when agents y and z presented their own arguments α 2 and α 3 , they revealed an implicit conflict between x's arguments and x's focal argument. In other words, they showed that x contradicts himself (i.e. committed a fallacy of some kind).
An important observation is that under the condition in Theorem 2, we need not assume that the actual set of possible presentable arguments is common knowledge. To ensure the strategy-proof property, each agent only needs to know that indirect defeat chains cannot arise from any of its arguments to its focal argument.
One may reasonably ask if the sufficient condition in Theorem 2 is also necessary for agents to reveal all their arguments truthfully. As Example 2 shows, this is not the case. In particular, for certain argumentation frameworks, an agent may have truthtelling as a dominant strategy despite the presence of indirect defeats among its own arguments. Note that in Example 2, truth revelation is now a dominant strategy for x despite the fact that α 1 → α 4 (note that here, x gains nothing by hiding α 1 ). This hinges on the presence of an argument (namely α 5 ) that cancels out the negative effect of the (in)direct self-defeat among x's own arguments.
When Agents can Hide or Lie
In the previous section, we restricted agent strategies to showing or hiding arguments in their own type. We did not allow agents to reveal arguments that are outside of their types. That is, agents were not allowed to lie by stating something they did not know, but only by hiding something they do know. This is the approach taken originally by us [Rahwan and Larson, 2008] .
In this section, we investigate (for the first time) strategyproofness of grounded mechanisms without this assumption. We first show that the characterization of strategy-proofness is identical to that when agents could only hide arguments (the only difference is that S ranges over A instead of A i ). 
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as the proof of Theorem 1, such that S ranges over A instead of A i .
As we did in the case of hiding, this result can be weakened to yield a more intuitive sufficient condition for strategyproofness. 
Following the definition of focal arguments, our goal above can be rephrased as proving, for any arbitrary S = A i , that:
, and let us show that 
Conclusion
ArgMD is a new paradigm for studying argumentation among self-interested agents using game-theoretic techniques. It provides a fresh perspective on the study of semantics for conflicting knowledge bases, especially when those are distributed among different entities (e.g. knowledge-based agents on the Semantic Web). While game-theoretic approaches have been applied extensively to resource allocation among agents (e.g. through auctions), no similar development has yet taken place for strategic aspects of interaction among knowledge-based agents. The only other paper that uses ArgMD to-date [Rahwan and Larson, 2008] dealt with a highly restricted form of agent preferences, and assumed agents can only hide, but not lie about, arguments. In this paper, we showed how ArgMD can be applied to more realistic preferences and action spaces.
Future work includes analysing incentives under other varieties of agent preferences and other argumentation semantics.
